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ARTICLES
A PARADIGM FOR DETERMINING THE ROLE
OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
Martin Guggenheim*
INTRODUCTIONT E process of determining the proper role of counsel for a young
child is a beguiling one. It appears much easier than it really is.
This is not to say that commentators thus far have agreed on the role
that counsel should undertake when representing young children.
There has been extensive, and often quite heated, debate on this sub-
ject. But if one distinguishes the merits from the choice of analytic
framework, it becomes apparent that there has been little attention
thus far to the means by which the merits are to be determined. Com-
mentators proceed directly to the merits, assuming that we already
know how one goes about resolving an issue of this sort.
The thesis of this Article is that we have skipped an important step,
in that there is much work that still needs to be done to resolve the
proper mode of analysis. This Article explores the relevant considera-
tions and offers an analytic framework or paradigm for determining
the role of counsel for "young children.", For these purposes, the term
"young children" will be defined to mean children so young that they
cannot articulate their preferences to counsel (e.g., newborns to chil-
dren ages two or three) and children who, though old enough to com-
municate, would be considered to be "impaired," within the meaning
of Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules" or "Rules").'
The central reason why the process of determining the proper role
of counsel in this context is so difficult is that we lack the guideposts
that exist in other fields of practice. The usual starting point for an
inquiry into the proper role of counsel is, of course, the profession's
articulation of that role in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code" or
"Code").2 But the Rules and Code both presuppose a client who is an
* Professor of Clinical Law; Director, Clinical and Advocacy Programs, New
York University School of Law. I wish to thank Randy Hertz, Peter Joy, and Made-
line Kurtz for their many helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful for
financial support from the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research
Fund at New York University School of Law.
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
2. Id.; Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1981) [hereinafter Model
Code].
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"unimpaired" adult.' Unimpaired adults are different from young
children in several crucial ways and the law consistently recognizes
these differences. With regard to newborns and infants, the obvious
physical difference is that these children, unlike adults, are unable to
communicate meaningfully with counsel. With regard to older young
children, though they have the physical capacity to communicate, their
lack of maturity, intelligence, and experience requires that their views
be given less weight than the views of an unimpaired adult (or an
older child for that matter). For this reason, few, if any, of the rules
pertaining to the purpose and duties of counsel for unimpaired adults
have any relevance to representing young children.
Although a specialized literature is being developed concerning the
representation of "impaired" adults,4 including the excellent sympo-
sium recently published in these pages,5 few of those principles are
helpful when addressing young children. The crucial difference be-
tween most impaired adults, such as the elderly, and young children, is
that those adults have lived a full life, during which their personalities,
values, and preferences became knowable. Young children, in con-
trast, have not yet reached the point in life when their" values have
been revealed.6 For this reason, the proposal that lawyers use "substi-
tuted judgment" when representing incompetent adults has little
meaning when applied to young children.7 Peter Margulies, for exam-
3. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14; Model Code, supra note 2, EC 7-11
& 7-12.
4. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14.
5. See Special Issue: Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L.
Rev. 961-1428 (1994).
6. Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Far. L.Q. 349, 362
(1993). Regarding the ability of the lawyer to understand what the client wants, the
author states:
A more realistic concern is whether an attorney can accurately identify that
which her young client would do if he were able to direct the litigation. The
question is not whether the position identified reflects the correct outcome,
but whether it correctly reflects that which the client would choose. Some
commentators convincingly argue that substituted judgment does not make
sense in the context of immature clients [citing Rachel M. Dufault, Com-
ment, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal Frame-
work in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 211, 240-41 (1991)].
Young children, by definition, have never been competent and their past acts
or statements are not considered competent evidence. The absence of evi-
dence of past intent makes it difficult to infer intent in the present.
Id.
For this reason, telling a lawyer for a young child to "pursue the lawyer's reason-
able view of the client's objectives or interests as the client would define them if able
to exercise rational judgment on the question" is an invitation to take a Rorschach
Test. American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 35
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
7. DuFault, supra note 6, at 240-41 (stating that young children, by definition,
have never been competent and their past acts or statements are not considered com-
petent evidence. The absence of evidence of past intent makes it difficult to infer
intent in the present.).
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ple, wisely recommends that lawyers representing impaired elderly cli-
ents make decisions on behalf of the client by taking into account the
client's lifetime commitments, where they can be determined, and the
objective fairness of the various alternative decisions.8 It is not possi-
ble to do the same thing on behalf of clients who have no lifetime
experience and have not formed, no less revealed, their values to
anyone.
Those of us trying to develop principles for representing young chil-
dren must recognize that the formal ethical rules of the legal profes-
sion fail to provide meaningful answers to most of the major questions
concerning the representation of young children. These rules are
dominated by their focus on representing adults and say virtually
nothing about how to represent a young child. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct unhelpfully instruct lawyers representing young
children "as far as reasonably possible, [to] maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client."9 The problem, of course, is that it
is impossible to maintain the same kind of relationship with a thirty-
five-year-old client as it is with a thirty-five-day-old client. Moreover,
although it is usually possible to maintain a substantially similar rela-
tionship with a thirty-five-year-old as it is with an eleven-year-old, the
Rules are unhelpful in clarifying where and how the relationships are
to differ.10 The earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility
does little more than acknowledge that the "responsibilities of a law-
yer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condi-
tion or age of a client." 11
The differences between adults and children, combined with the
failure of the ethical rules to adequately address these differences,
leave commentators writing about representing children without the
moorings usually anchoring discussions on ethical duties of legal rep-
resentatives. Most commentators, myself included, have been primar-
fly interested in debating among ourselves the proper role of counsel
for young children in a variety of different legal proceedings without
tackling the subject systematically.' 2 In a sense, we have concentrated
on the wrong question. We have jumped too quickly to the admittedly
more practical subject of what lawyers should do when representing
young children. As I hope to demonstrate, however, what is vitally
8. Peter Margulies, Access, Connection and Voice: A Contextual Approach to
Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham. L. Rev. 1073,
1088-89 (1994).
9. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14.
10. The Model Rules do little more than tell lawyers that when representing a
client with a disability, "the lawyer often must act as de facto guardian." Id. Rule 1.14
cmt. They are silent on what this means or what precise steps a de facto guardian
should take.
11. Model Code, supra note 2, EC 7-11.
12. For a list of some of the many articles on representing children published since
1976, see Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in
Context, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1473, 1473 n.1 (1996).
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needed is an agreed-upon procedure-a paradigm-for determining
the appropriate role of a lawyer for a young person in the wide range
of situations for which courts or legislatures have failed to provide the
answer.
13
This Article seeks to develop a methodology for determining the
role of counsel for newborns, infants, toddlers, and children deemed
to be "impaired" within the meaning of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.14 Because such a universally accepted procedure is
currently lacking, the current literature lacks the grounding necessary
for any serious debate." The debate over the role of a young child's
representative will certainly continue long into the future. It would be
substantially enriched when a process for analyzing the issues has
been developed. This is the principal task that I hope to achieve in
this Article.
Part I addresses the reasons it is essential to develop a methodology
for examining role questions for children's representatives. Part H be-
gins the development of a paradigm for determining the role of coun-
sel for young children. First, it explores the reasons that lawyers for
adults are required to follow their clients' instructions. Then the Arti-
cle discusses some of the ways in which the law treats children differ-
ently from adults and the reasons for this differential treatment. Next,
the Article attempts a preliminary examination of the role of counsel
in several specific contexts. Part II concludes with a proposed para-
digm for ascertaining counsel's role for young children. Part III ap-
plies the paradigm to three areas of the law: criminal and delinquency
proceedings in which children are accused of violating the penal law,
custody and visitation proceedings arising out of divorce or separa-
tion, and child protective proceedings in which parents are charged
with unfitness.
13. See, e.g., Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 276 (Conn. 1993). The court held:
The legislature has not delineated, nor has this court yet been presented with
the opportunity to delineate, the obligations and limitations of the role of
counsel for a minor child. We recognize that representing a child creates
practical problems for an attorney and that this important issue, at some
point, needs to be addressed.... [H]owever, this case is not an appropriate
vehicle for a discussion of the role of counsel for a minor child.
Id.
14. No one has, thus far, satisfactorily developed a paradigm for distinguishing
between "unimpaired" and "impaired" children. Such an undertaking is, however,
beyond-the scope of this Article. The Article does not tell lawyers how to determine
which children belong in which category. However, in accordance with the principles
developed in part II C., infra, there are reasons to err on the side of treating children
as "impaired" in a number of particular proceedings, such as custody and visitation
cases. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
15. As I will elaborate in part m, the failure to apply. the paradigm developed in
this Article led me to a significant error in Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Rep-
resented But Not Heard. Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 76 (1984).
[Vol. 641402
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I. THE NEED TO DEVELOP A PARADIGM FOR DETERMINING THE
ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
Imagine that a state legislature recently enacted a law concerning
progressive education. The new legislation gives children the right to
be placed in an advanced science or math course in the third grade.
Under the law, the local board of education is obliged to place chil-
dren in the advanced class unless the board can demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence why a particular child should not be so
placed. The law goes on to spell out the procedural requirements
when children are not placed in the advanced class. When the board
decides not to place a child in an advanced course, there must be a
prompt administrative hearing before a neutral fact finder. At this
hearing, the child must be represented by counsel.
The legislative history behind the law's passage makes clear that the
law was the product of modem educational theory that children thrive
best when exposed to difficult subject matter at an early age and are
labeled "advanced" and told that they have the capacity to handle
difficult subjects. For several years, the law was merely precatory and
delegated to local boards all authority to place children. However, the
legislature found that when board decisions were made in the absence
of administrative oversight, too many children had been kept out of
the advanced course. For this reason, the new law provides for
prompt review with counsel appointed for the student. Both the stat-
ute and legislative history, however, are silent on the role and purpose
of counsel. 16
Some parents' groups and educators strongly disagree with the
premise of the statute and argue that exposing children to too difficult
a curriculum at an early age will be extremely detrimental to their
self-esteem and will adversely affect their other studies. Not only will
these children not do well in the more difficult course, these oppo-
nents of the law suggest, but the childrenwill do less well in their
other subjects too. Finally, the opponents of the law claim that the
students who would ordinarily do well in a class consisting only of
very capable students will be adversely affected by teacher's having to
lower the instructional level to the lowest common denominator.
Now assume that Jodi, an eight-year-old child who is about to enter
the third grade, was not placed in an advanced class. An attorney is
assigned to represent her. What should the attorney do and, more
importantly at the outset, how should the attorney determine what her
role should be?
It is essential that there be a shared understanding of the duties of
Jodi's counsel. Indeed, the failure to agree upon these duties would
have grave, and ultimately intolerable, consequences. Without an
identified task, Jodi's counsel would flounder. She would be free to
16. This is, unfortunately, a common situation. See supra note 13.
14031996]
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define for herself the role to play in the proceeding. Because that role
would have no boundaries, it could be shaped in whatever way a par-
ticular lawyer chose. That would be the equivalent of chaos; individ-
ual lawyers free to determine for themselves the role they want to
play in the proceedings. Under such circumstances, it is certain that
different lawyers would do drastically different things, even though
they would be representing similarly situated children. It is also cer-
tain that, over time, lawyers would assign to themselves diametrically
opposite roles in indistinguishable circumstances.
By saying that lawyers would do drastically different things, I do not
mean that some would be better, more eloquent, more prepared,
more skillful, or more knowledgeable of the facts or the law. If that
were the only way in which the lawyers could be distinguished from
each other, there would be no real reason to complain. Those kinds of
differences simply are unavoidable. The law's commitnient to equal
treatment under law is not lessened by the reality that not all mem-
bers of the bar are equal. Although some lawyers necessarily will be
more effective than others at achieving results, so long as all lawyers
see themselves as trying to achieve similar results in identical circum-
stances, the law's commitment to equality of treatment remains intact.
The different things these lawyers would be doing involve trying to
accomplish different results. This is incompatible with any recogniza-
ble system of law. Consider its implications when applied to the rep-
resentation of adults. An adult hires a lawyer to help in a legal
proceeding. One lawyer chooses to achieve the objectives sought by
the client, whether or not the lawyer agrees that those objectives are
proper or beneficial to the client. Another lawyer decides to sabotage
the client's objectives because the lawyer thinks the client should not
prevail. A third lawyer is willing to help the client achieve what the
client wants but insists that all reasons for opposing the client's objec-
tives be fully aired before the fact finder so that whatever outcome is
achieved will be based on as full a record as possible. This "system"
of law is almost unimaginable precisely because it is so obviously no
"system" at all.
Yet these are the very consequences we would face if we fail to
identify a role for Jodi's counsel. Thus, whatever else we accomplish,
it is imperative to agree upon the role that lawyers should perform.
Indeed, this is a crucial purpose served by the professional rules regu-
lating the conduct of lawyers representing adults. A regulatory code
of professional behavior is needed for at least four purposes. Though
these are interrelated, it is helpful to list them separately. First, a code
is needed to tell lawyers what is expected of them, including actions in
which they are permitted to engage and prohibited from engaging.
Second, a code is needed to tell clients what to expect from the profes-
sionals to whom they turn for assistance. From this vantage, a code is
crucial to ensure that clients will even bother engaging the profes-
1404 [Vol. 64
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sional. Unless clients know what they are purchasing when retaining a
professional, it is not likely that many of them would sign the retainer.
Third, a code is needed to establish norms that may be enforced by a
sanctioning body. These are all essential features of a code regulating
the conduct of any profession. They also serve as the bedrock of both
the Model Rules and the Model Code.17 Apart from these three inter-
related purposes, a code is needed to establish uniformity of behavior.
Without this, there would be no way to ensure "uniformity of justice
and the rule of law.""
Law has already succeeded at developing a uniform role of counsel
for adults. The challenge remains to develop a process by which such
a role is defined. It is my claim that, although the role of counsel for
young children and adults turns out to be very different, the route by
which one defines these different roles is identical. For this reason, we
should begin by studying the process by which the role of an adult's
counsel was defined. Once that process has been uncovered, we will
be in a position to apply the same principles to the subject of repre-
senting children. After that, we will return to the hypothetical and
attempt to give direction to Jodi's lawyer.
II. DEVELOPING THE PARADIGM
A. Why Adults Enjoy the Power to Set the Objectives of the
Litigation and Direct the Conduct of Their Lawyer
The role of counsel for an unimpaired adult is immeasurably sim-
pler to identify than the role of counsel for a young child. As we all
know, lawyers for adults are obliged to "abide by the client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation"' 9 and to use their skill to
achieve the objectives sought by the client.20 But it turns out that this
is less a statement about lawyers than it is about the power of
unimpaired adults.
Unimpaired adults have the inherent power to make all the impor-
tant decisions concerning their lives. Our commitment to individual
17. See, e.g., Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its His-
tory and Objectives, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 4, 7 (1970) (discussing the meaning of profes-
sional responsibility).
18. John F. Sutton, Jr., Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A
Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 Tenn. L. Rev. 132, 141 (1966).
19. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.2.
20. I recognize of course, that the subject of representing unimpaired clients is
considerably more sophisticated than this, and that there is a vast literature both on
the counseling function lawyers should perform before clients may or should tell their
lawyers what objectives to seek, see Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility:
Ethics by the Pervasive Method 425-32 (1994), and on the duties of lawyers to avoid
harm to others, even when their clients wish to inflict such harm. See David Luban,
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 157 (1988). Nonetheless, the central function
of lawyers representing unimpaired clients is to use their skill to achieve objectives
determined by their clients.
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autonomy is the central principle from which all issues regarding the
role of counsel representing unimpaired adults are discussed.2 Be-
cause adults have the greater right to make all of the important deci-
sions in their lives, they have the lesser right to choose the objectives
of all matters that would merit their seeking legal services. There is
nothing inherent in the role of counsel that demands they faithfully
carry out their adult client's wishes. The lawyer's role is simply the
corollary of an adult's rights and powers.
The contours of counsel's role were formed after the powers and
rights of adults had already been defined.' Consider again what our
system of law would look like if lawyers were free not to carry out
their client's wishes. If lawyers retained by adults failed to attempt to
secure results sought by their clients, the lawyers would deny their
clients the power to control their lives. They would, in other words,
breach their client's rights. When principals are empowered by sub-
stantive law with the right of self-determination, it is essential to re-
quire their agents to do the principals' bidding. Unless unimpaired
adults could rely on their agents to do their bidding, these adults
would be unable to control their lives.
The literature on representing unimpaired clients has not needed to
develop a paradigm for answering questions regarding the role of
counsel because all have implicitly understood the autonomy rights of
adults. Simply stated, only by allocating to clients the ultimate author-
ity to determine the goals of the litigation is it possible for an adult to
exercise autonomy rights. This is so basic to our thinking that we
sometimes forget how deeply the rules regulating the conduct of an
unimpaired adult's counsel's role are framed against this fundamental
concept.
But these fundamental concepts are inapplicable with regard to
young children.23 A great many young children are too young even to
communicate their views. An even larger number of children are old
enough to express themselves but may lack the maturity or compe-
tence required before their views ought to dictate their lawyers' con-
21. The function of an attorney in our legal system is to enable litigants to
pursue and protect their legal rights. This approach furthers our system's
emphasis on individual rights and personal autonomy.... Client-centered
litigation reflects society's consensus that individuals should control their
own lives and make their own decisions, even if those decisions seem illogi-
cal or unwise.
Wilber, supra note 6, at 353.
22. The Commentary to Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
explains that "[t]he normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that
the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about
important matters." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14 cmt. (emphasis added).
More precisely, this relationship is based on the understanding that the client is enti-
tled to make decisions about important matters.
23. See generally Laura M. Purdy, In Their Best Interest? The Case Against
Equal Rights for Children (1992).
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duct.24 As a result, a much more complex discussion of the role of
counsel for young children is necessary.
B. The Crucial Differences Between Adults and Young Children
It is difficult to imagine a more extreme contrast than the one be-
tween the autonomy rights of unimpaired adults and the disabilities of
young children. Virtually none of the principles described in the pre-
ceding section are applicable to young children. As Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit remind us, "Children are by definition
persons in need of adult caretakers who determine what is best for
them."'  Celebrating the right of an adult to autonomy does not,
therefore, tell us very much about children's right to autonomy. Law
treats children differently than adults in many ways. This differential
treatment derives from one fundamental notion: Adults presump-
tively have the reasoning capacity to make important decisions for
themselves; young children do not.
As a result, the law places children in a position of dependency. As
the Supreme Court has written, children,
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.... Children, by
definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their
parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part
as parens patriae.26
In 1995, Justice Scalia stressed the limited rights children possess:
Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors
lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-
including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right
to come and go at will. They are subject, even as to their physical
freedom, to the control of their parents or guardians. 27
Our most enlightened laws that are exclusively applied to children
would be regarded as repugnant if applied to adults. Requiring adults
to attend school for six hours per day, five days a week, for more than
forty weeks each year, for example, would obviously constitute a sig-
nificant restriction on liberty. Yet, compulsory education laws are a
prominent example of what we characterize as children's rights.28
Most children's rights are of this kind.29
24. See Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolv-
ing Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 15tf3, 1550-51
(1994).
25. Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child 122 (1979).
26. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citations omitted).
27. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995).
28. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-40 (1973);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning
of Parental Rights, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 975, 1010-16 (1988); Michael S. Wald, Children's
Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 255, 260 (1979).
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Because of the central differences in the law's treatment and defini-
tion of adults' and children's rights, it is essential that the implicit pol-
icies behind the rules for representing adults be made explicit when
discussing the role of counsel for young children. As we shall see,
when ascertaining the role of counsel for a young child, whether law
or policy empowers, or refuses to empower children with a prominent
role in deciding their own future is a critical distinction. In some cir-
cumstances, children possess virtually the same autonomy rights as
adults.30 When this is the case, we need not invent a new role of coun-
sel for children. The role of counsel for adults is all we need to refer-
ence. According to this paradigm, in such cases children enjoy the
identical right to the kind of counsel as adults.3
In most situations, however, children are not empowered to control
the outcome of the case.3 1 The difference is even sharper. Children
are not merely "not empowered"; they are disempowered. In these
situations, carefully designed rules encourage courts to reach out-
comes that directly affect children even if the child would not approve
of that outcome.
C. Identifying the Interests That Should Be Served by the Paradigm:
A Preliminary Examination of the Role of Counsel in
Various Contexts
The differences between adults and children do not invariably re-
quire that the representation of young children will never involve en-
hancing their autonomy. Because of these differences, however, we
should not assume such a purpose.3 3 Once that assumption is re-
moved, it becomes necessary to articulate the purpose of the represen-
tation. If we conclude ultimately that the purpose is to increase client
autonomy, that conclusion should be reached through a method of
analysis that can be applied to all situations.
To determine whether the role of counsel is to enhance the auton-
omy of the child, one should first ascertain what the law says about
30. For example, children possess autonomy rights virtually identical to adults
when children are prosecuted for alleged criminal behavior.
31. See infra parts II.C.2, llI.A.
32. Among the many circumstances in which a young child's views are either con-
sidered irrelevant or accorded relatively insignificant weight even though the child's
future is directly involved are adoptions, paternity actions, child protection proceed-
ings (at least during the adjudicatory phase when the court must determine whether
or not a parent has endangered a child), and child custody and visitation proceedings.
Children are also disabled from working in most occupations and even from entering
into a legally binding contract in most situations.
33. As will be demonstrated later in this Article, "unimpaired" children within the
meaning of the Model Rules have the legal rights to autonomy, at least within the
narrow limits of setting the objectives of the litigation. For this reason, the text uses
the term "young children" to mean "impaired" children. All unimpaired children
have limited autonomy rights to control what their lawyers does on their behalf. The
text addresses what should happen when lawyers represent impaired children.
[Vol. 641408
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the desirability or appropriateness of enhancing a child's autonomy in
the particular proceeding under discussion. This involves a two-part
inquiry. First, is the child of sufficient age, intelligence, and maturity
to be "unimpaired" as defined by the Model Rules? If the answer is
"yes," the inquiry should cease. In these circumstances, children are
empowered by established principles to set the objectives of the litiga-
tion. If the answer is "no," then it is necessary to continue the inquiry
by examining whether and to what degree children are supposed to
have autonomy rights in the particular subject matter under consider-
ation. To illustrate this principle, we will return to the case of ad-
vanced educational placement discussed in the previous section.
After that, we will look at a second example, drawn from the real
world.
1. The Role of Counsel in the Hypothetical
Advanced Placement Case
We left the discussion of the role of the lawyer for Jodi, the third
grader who was not placed in an advanced class, with the challenge of
developing a paradigm for ascertaining that role. Now we may begin
the task of discovering Jodi's lawyer's role in the administrative re-
view process by examining Jodi's rights. If Jodi is considered
"unimpaired," no further inquiry is needed. Her lawyer will have no
choice but to allow Jodi to set the objectives for the case.
But what should happen when Jodi is considered to be "impaired"?
What, in other words, should her lawyer do when the Model Rules do
not require that the lawyer seek the objectives Jodi wants? Is the law-
yer free to let Jodi decide the goals to be pursued? This question is
answerable by examining Jodi's rights in connection with the educa-
tion case itself. As an eight-year-old, Jodi has no inherent legal right
to self-determination. For most purposes, the law presumes that
eight-year-olds do not have such rights.3 The few instances in which
children are empowered to make decisions about their future are
clearly spelled out in the law.35 For this reason, to determine whether
such an exception exists in Jodi's case, we need to examine the hypo-
thetical education statute at issue.
34. See Federle, supra note 24, at 1550-58 (discussing empowerment of children in
divorce proceedings).
35. For example, in many states, children of any age may seek and receive medical
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases or substance addiction without notice to
or permission from anyone. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-102 (1987) (allowing
child to receive treatment for drug abuse without consent of parent); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 19a-216 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) (not requiring parental consent for treat-
ment of minor for venereal disease); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.343 (West 1989) (allowing
minor to give effective consent for.., treatment of venereal disease and alcohol or
drug abuse); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2305 (McKinney 1993) (not requiring parental
consent for treatment of a minor with a sexually transmissible disease).
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By examining that law, we easily conclude that Jodi has no right to
self-determination in this matter. Rather, she has the right to be
placed in an advanced class unless the board of education can per-
suade a neutral fact finder that she should not be so placed. In partic-
ular, Jodi must be placed in an advanced class if the board determines
that she should be there or if the board is unable to demonstrate that
she should not be there. The legislature has thus decided that Jodi
belongs in an advanced class even if that might not be best for her.
Jodi's substantive right, in other words, is to be in an advanced class,
even if she and her parents do not want her to be there and even if the
case is close as to whether it is a good idea that she be there. These
are her carefully delineated rights as established by the legislature.
We can now begin to discern the responsibilities of Jodi's lawyer.3 6
Let us consider three prominent possibilities that her lawyer might
consider. One possibility would be to interview Jodi, find out what
she would like to do, and attempt to accomplish her goals. A second
possibility would be to interview her parents, find out what they
would like, and attempt to accomplish their goals (this possibility will
appear even more attractive when Jodi and her parents want the same
result). A third possibility would be to investigate the case indepen-
dently, perhaps through expert services, and advocate the result the
lawyer concludes is the right one for Jodi.37
None of these possibilities, however, would be consistent with the
law as the legislature intended it to be enforced. The legislature did
not enact the law in order to give children an option to avoid ad-
vanced placement when they are opposed to it. Indeed, Jodi does not
even have the right to appeal from a board decision placing her in the
advanced class. The only reason a hearing is about to take place (and
the only reason Jodi is being given a lawyer) is that the board made a
decision about Jodi's placement that is contrary to what the legislature
ordinarily prefers. The legislation is clear that all children should be
placed in the advanced class unless the board can justify not doing so
by clear and convincing proof. Moreover, the legislature wants Jodi in
the advanced class even when Jodi herself thinks she should not be
there. Indeed, Jodi's preference is irrelevant.
36. We are, of course, assuming that Jodi is an "impaired" client within the mean-
ing of the Model Rules.
37. Model Rule 1.14 fails to give the lawyer sufficient guidance to behave in any
particular way. The Comment to this Rule hints that it is appropriate for Jodi's law-
yer to give significant weight to Jodi's preference, even if she is impaired because she
is likely to have "the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
about matters affecting [her] own well-being." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14
cint. At the same time, to the extent that a child's parent can be seen as the
equivalent of Jodi's "legal representative," the Comment instructs the lawyer to look
to the parents for guidance. Id Finally, the Comment authorizes lawyers to become
"de facto guardians," which would allow them to undertake a factual investigation
and recommend the outcome that appears most appropriate to the lawyer. IL
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For this reason, Jodi's lawyer would be contravening the legisla-
ture's judgment by supporting the board's decision based on Jodi's
opposition to the advanced placement.38 First, Jodi's views on the ap-
propriateness of the placement would gain influence even though tfey
are legally irrelevant. It is reasonable to assume for purposes of ascer-
taining Jodi's lawyer's role that when a lawyer forcefully advocates for
a particular outcome, the lawyer will influence the ultimate fact finder
in a significant percentage of cases. When this advocacy is the exclu-
sive product of the child's preferences, those preferences have become
far more influential-through the indirect route of providing a child
with a spokesperson-than the law originally contemplated.39 Law-
yers for children should take into account the weight the law accords a
child's view in determining the influence of the child's view in shaping
counsel's position. Jodi's lawyer should not give more weight to Jodi's
views than'the legislature prescribed. When the child's view has no
bearing on the outcome, lawyers for children should not advocate
their client's preferences.
In addition, no one in the proceeding would be advocating a posi-
tion opposite the board's initial decision that Jodi should not be
placed in the advanced class. The legislature contemplated a mean-
ingful review of the board's decision. When both parties at the hear-
ing support that decision, however, the prospects for meaningful
review are substantially diminished.
Some may object that this analysis overlooks the fact that the legis-
lature insisted that Jodi be represented by counsel and that, once
counsel is assigned, another set of principles necessarily must prevail.
This superseding set of principles is the code of ethical rules concern-
ing the role of counsel and the professional responsibilities of attor-
neys. Under this approach, the legislature implicitly incorporated all
the rules and obligations of counsel when it chose to assign counsel to
Jodi and, therefore, Jodi's counsel is expected to look to the Model
Code (or the Model Rules) to ascertain counsel's role.
As applied to children who are considered "unimpaired" under the
Model Rules, this objection is unanswerable because the law unam-
biguously authorizes the children to set the objectives for the case.
This is consistent with the principle that in determining the role of
counsel for children, lawyers should be law enforcers.
There are two sources used in determining when law empowers
children to set their own objectives. If either source empowers chil-
38. Many may regard as extreme my characterization of a lawyer's allowing a
young child to set the objectives the lawyer will seek to achieve as tantamount to
undermining the law. To these readers, there is a distinction between a lawyer's advo-
cating for particular results based on factors that the law does not recognize and un-
dermining the law. I will address this point more fully in parts III.B. & III.C., infra.
39. The specific concern that a child's views will be too prominent when counsel
zealously advocates a result sought by the child will be developed more thoroughly.
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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dren, then their lawyers must permit them to determine the objectives
of the litigation. The first source is the set of professional rules for
lawyers. Under those rules, unimpaired children are authorized to set
the objectives for cases in which they are represented by counsel. It is
immaterial whether another law provides additional authority for chil-
dren to control their lives. The rules of the legal profession are them-
selves a substantive source of legal authority. Those rules make clear
that unimpaired clients (even those who are under legal disabilities
because of age) have the power to set the objectives of the litigation.
To this extent, therefore, when courts or legislatures see fit to provide
counsel for children, they must accept the ground rules that accom-
pany such representation and recognize that counsel for unimpaired
children are obliged by the canons of their profession to vigorously
seek to achieve the outcomes dictated by their clients. The only cer-
tain way for courts or legislatures to avoid this is to not provide coun-
sel for unimpaired children.40
But the same cannot be said with regard to impaired children, such
as Jodi. Because the ethical rules do not provide meaningful guidance
for lawyers representing impaired clients,4' it is a circular argument to
suggest that lawyers are bound by those rules to represent young chil-
dren in a particular way. Rather, the only way to determine the de-
gree to which a young client should be empowered to set the
objectives of the litigation is to study the second source of law. This is
the substantive law controlling the principles by which the case is to
be decided. When that law empowers children, as, for example, in the
case of juvenile delinquency proceedings,4' that is the end of the mat-
ter: The child can set the objectives.
Lawyers representing impaired children should consider the law
and legislative intent. Where the legislature wants a child's own views
to be an important factor in the decision-making process, the child's
views should become prominent. When the law neither desires nor
requires a child's view to be prominent, however, they should not
be.43 When children's views are not substantively important, lawyers
40. It is unclear whether it is possible for legislatures to appoint counsel for
unimpaired children and define counsel's role by instructing counsel not to permit
their clients to set the objectives of the litigation. Such a rule probably would violate
the lawyer's ethical duty to an unimpaired client.
41. See supra notes 10 and 37.
42. See infra part III.A.
43. Although this Article does not directly address how lawyers should determine
when their clients are "impaired" or "unimpaired," it should be appropriate for law-
yers to take into account the substantive autonomy rights children possess in the re-
lated subject area. This does not mean lawyers are free to deem unimpaired clients as
impaired whenever their clients do not have substantive autonomy rights in the sub-ject area of the case. But it may be appropriate in such cases for lawyers to presump-
tively treat children as impaired in close cases. See supra note 14.
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for children should not advocate the outcome sought by the child
merely because it is what the child wants.44
Neither should the lawyer give more weight to the parents' views
than the legislature intended.45 The legislation was not passed to per-
mit parents to choose which placement their child should receive. The
elected officials decided to override parental authority by preferring
placement in the advanced class even when the parents believe it
would poorly serve their child. It is legally irrelevant whether the par-
ents want Jodi in the advanced class or are opposed to her being there.
Jodi's parents may well be opposed to the legislation, but the law was
duly enacted anyway. The law left no room for individual parental
choice. Its whole purpose was to override such choice by setting uni-
form rules of placement regardless of the views of parents in full rec-
ognition that some parents oppose the law and would not want their
children advanced too easily. If Jodi's lawyer now cedes to the par-
ents the very same authority the legislation denied them, the parents
would have achieved indirectly through the use of their child's counsel
what they were denied directly.
The most complex issue remaining is whether Jodi's lawyer is per-
mitted under any circumstances to advocate that Jodi should not be
placed in the advanced class. The lawyer should be barred from doing
this, for several reasons. Apart from the absence of any legislative
authority for such a role,4 6 permitting lawyers this "independence"
frequently would not advance, and would occasionally undermine, the
law's purposes.
The question remains whether the lawyer should be permitted to
oppose the placement because the lawyer has become personally con-
vinced that the placement is unwise and would disserve Jodi's best
44. Courts and legislatures, unlike members of the bar, are authorized to change
the law by shifting to children more influence in outcomes than they previously or
currently enjoy under the law. These changes, however, must be made explicitly. Im-
portant changes to the substantive law should not be effected indirectly through pro-
cedural alterations. Procedure is shaped by substantive rights, not the other way
around. One does not have substantive rights because of particular procedural pro-
tections; one has particular procedural protections in order to ensure that one's sub-
stantive rights are respected. The degree to which a child's views should be a factor in
the outcome ought not be enlarged simply because a child is represented by counsel.
In certain proceedings, such as custody and visitation proceedings, a child's prefer-
ence is one of the factors judges must take into account when deciding the outcome.
When the child's views are relevant to the outcome, the child's lawyer must make
them known to the court. But making a child's views known is not the same thing as
forcefully attempting to secure the outcome preferred by the child.
45. This is so only because we are describing the role of Jodi's counsel. If the
parents were entitled to representation at the hearing, their attorney would be obliged
to let the clients set the objectives of the representation.
46. The statute says nothing about authorizing randomly chosen members of the
bar to become both an investigator and a fact finder.
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interests.47 It is important to emphasize that the Model Rules do not
bar Jodi's lawyer from opposing the placement once the lawyer be-
lieves that opposition serves the client's interests.' These rules ex-
plicitly allow lawyers to assume the role of "de facto guardian."49 As
a guardian, the lawyer may choose the best position for a ward and
undertake efforts to achieve the position the guardian thinks is best.
Although the professional rules allow this, Jodi's lawyer-and all law-
yers for young children-should eschew this alternative. Though su-
perficially appealing to assign lawyers the task of being spokepersons
for young children and advocating for outcomes on their behalf, such
advocacy causes more problems than it solves. Our system of law
works best when we discourage lawyers for young children from en-
gaging in such advocacy.
An important assumption is that the advocacy of an adult serving as
a child's representative often will directly affect the results of cases.
The question naturally follows whether it makes sense to want a
child's representative-whether that representative is called "lawyer,"
"de facto guardian," or "guardian ad litem,"-advocating for a partic-
ular result. When lawyers advocate for particular outcomes because
they believe such results are best for their client, there are reasons to
be wary. Guardians are commonly called upon to make decisions on
their wards' behalf in a variety of situations.50 The law should tolerate
sparingly adults serving in a role other than a judge to make important
decisions about someone else, even a child. Guardians51 may be use-
ful when they are necessary. Unless indispensable, our system is bet-
ter off by limiting the circumstances under which randomly chosen
professionals may decide important matters for another person.
Law should strive to achieve two goals in creating rules for child
advocacy. The first is to ensure uniformity of behavior so that lawyers
will know what is expected of them when performing their profes-
sional role, clients will receive similar services from their lawyers, and
courts will obtain similar benefits from the lawyers' input. The second
47. Obviously, the least acceptable reason for Jodi's lawyer to oppose placement
would be because the lawyer merely thought the law was "wrong." For this reason in
particular, we should always be wary of delegating to individual lawyers the power to
decide what result to seek for their clients. It would be impossible to know whether
the lawyer's choice was the direct or indirect product of the lawyer's own personal
view of the wisdom of the controlling legal principles.
48. The Comment to Rule 1.14 states: "If the person has no guardian or legal
representative, the lawyer often must act as de facto guardian." Model Rules, supra
note 1, Rule 1.14 cmt. As a "de facto guardian," the Model Rules appear to authorize
a lawyer to advocate a position contrary to what the client wants. Presumably, this
would permit counsel to decide the best outcome for the client.
49. Id.
50. Examples include a fiduciary's decision to cy-pres a trust or a guardian of an
insane person's decision to seek the ward's commitment.
51. For these purposes, "guardian" means adults formally charged with the re-
sponsibility of making decisions on behalf of wards and seeking results established by
the adult.
1414 [Vol. 64
ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
goal is to maximize the probability of advancement of a child's legal
rights.
The former goal is frustrated when lawyers are permitted to advo-
cate for a particular result. When we allow this, once again we have
unavoidably entered the chaotic universe of disparate professional be-
havior. Cases will be decided largely on the basis of the views of the
randomly chosen counsel representing the child.52 Similar cases will
be decided differently merely because of assignment of a different
lawyer. Some lawyers will end up seeking diametrically opposed re-
sults in indistinguishable cases. The only differences in these cases fre-
quently will be the personalities, values, and opinions of the randomly
chosen lawyers.5 3 If state action were involved-as it often is when
counsel is court assigned-this would violate an important principle of
due process. 54
Due process guarantees that like cases receive like process-i.e., a
similar mode of consideration. To the greatest extent possible, parties
are entitled to procedural regularity and uniformity in the processing
that leads to the outcome. The introduction of an attorney whose bi-
ases may affect the processing of cases so that like cases are presented
for judicial consideration in a different fashion threatens these due
process concerns.
A related due process concern arises when lawyers are authorized
to engage in a fact-finding mission and then seek to influence a court
to reach an outcome that they have concluded is correct. The process
by which they reached that conclusion cannot be subjected to mean-
ingful inquiry.55 Whether the lawyers are more or less risk averse will
52. See Martin Guggenheim, The Making of Standards for Representing Children
in Custody and Visitation Proceedings: The Report's Perspective, J. Am. Academy Of
Matrimonial Law. (1995) (forthcoming Feb. 1996). In that Article, I state:
[T]he most serious threat to the rule of law posed by the assignment of law-
yers for children... [is] the introduction of an adult who is free to advocate
his or her own preferred outcome in the name of the child's best interests.
The danger ... is that this extra person will make a difference in the out-
come of the proceeding without providing an.y assurance that the outcome
will be "better" than if no representative had joined the case.... [U]nless
lawyers assigned to "represent" young children [are] given specific tasks to
perform which [do] not depend on the lawyers' values or personal beliefs,
[we] would be inviting arbitrary role behavior on the lawyers' part and arbi-
trary outcomes even in similarly situated cases.
Id. (manuscript at 17, on file with Fordham Law Review).
53. Were Jodi's lawyer to choose to decide the "correct" result on the basis of the
lawyer's personal views about the wisdom of the legislation, some lawyers chosen to
represent children in these proceedings would agree with the legislative choice of ad-
vancing recalcitrant children. Others, however, would disagree.
54. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-05 (1982); Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 319-25 (1981).
55. Due process of law requires that fact finders make their determinations only
based on a fully reviewable record. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This, however, would be impossible if chil-
dren's lawyers became fact finders.
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surely affect their conclusions. 6 Whether they like or dislike a partic-
ular individual also has a real but undetectable bearing on their ulti-
mate conclusions. Whether the lawyers observe an event that affects
their ultimate conclusion, which is fairly representative of the larger
picture about the family or is aberrational, similarly will not become
known in virtually any case. These factors are only several examples
of countless ingredients that can significantly influence the lawyer's
final result. When the lawyers' conclusions influence a judge to rule in
favor of their position, the final outcome of the case is the indirect
product of an invisible process. Principled adjudication should avoid
such dangers whenever possible.
We should be especially wary of using guardians when we cannot be
confident that a child's rights will be advanced by liberating her law-
yer to advocate the result the lawyer perceives is correct. Consider
the problem inherent in assigning two professionals to the same case,
each of whom is authorized to reach conclusions about the correct
outcome, and one of whom speaks in the voice of the child's lawyer
trying to persuade the other (the judge) to reach the conclusions be-
lieved by the lawyer to be correct. Particularly with a close case, liber-
ating a lawyer to advocate for the result the lawyer believes is correct
invites errors. In such cases, there is the unavoidable danger that the
wrong result will be reached because the lawyer argued the wrong
outcome. In an unknown number of cases, the lawyer's power will be
enhanced at the client's cost.
What, then, is the appropriate role for Jodi's lawyer? Simply stated,
she should be expected to support the law by advancing Jodi's rights
as the legislature and case law have articulated them. This is best ac-
complished by defining the lawyer's major function as ensuring that
the process established by the legislature is faithfully followed or, in
the words of the Supreme Court, by "insist[ing] upon regularity of the
proceedings."57
The process in this situation has two principal components. First, all
the reasons for and against the placement should be brought to the
attention of the neutral fact finder. Second, the fact finder should
56. See Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The
Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol'y 423 (1993). Noting how lawyers may affect the outcome of a case, the author
states:
[I]f attorneys with a specific organization often represent children who have
been abused, and the goal of the organization is to remove children from
abusive situations rather than attempt to reunite the family, then the lawyer
with that organization may believe the allegations of abuse by a child even
where those allegations are untrue. "If this occurs on a regular basis, the
outcome in child protective proceedings will be systematically skewed to-
ward removal."
Id. at 452 n.123 (quoting Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 106).
57. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
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overrule the board's decision unless she is convinced there are good
reasons not to put Jodi in an advanced class.
Jodi's lawyer fully discharges all responsibilities to Jodi when she
ensures that the process is carried out as the legislature intended. This
means insisting that Jodi be placed in an advanced class unless con-
vincing reasons not to do so are brought to the fact finder's attention.
To this end, the lawyer should ensure that whatever reasons the board
has for not placing her in an advanced class be brought before the
neutral fact finder. It is also permissible for the lawyer to conduct an
investigation and bring to the fact finder's attention all facts that
would support or oppose Jodi's placement. In addition, Jodi's lawyer
serves her well by insisting on a speedy resolution of the matter so
that Jodi will know the class in which she belongs as early in the
school term as possible. Jodi's lawyer should take whatever steps are
feasible to ensure that the proceedings are the least disruptive to
Jodi's life. We can be confident that Jodi's rights-as defined by duly
enacted officials-are being advanced, however, only when all lawyers
agree not to intrude their own views on the matter.
2. The Role of Counsel for an Eleven-Year-Old
Seeking an Abortion
Janet is an eleven-year-old girl who is in her second month of preg-
nancy. Janet filed a petition in a Wisconsin circuit court yesterday to
terminate her pregnancy. The law requires that before a doctor may
perform the abortion, Janet obtain either the written, consent of one of
her parents or an adult family member, or a judicial waiver.58 The
judge must give her consent to a waiver if the judge finds that Janet is
"mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on
her own" or if the judge finds that the abortion is in Jodi's best inter-
ests.59 Only if the judge finds that Janet is immature or uninformed
and that the abortion is not in her best interests, may the judge pro-
hibit the abortion.60
Although the meaning of "well-informed" in this context may be
inferred from the requirements of "informed consent" for any woman
undergoing an abortion,61 the law does not specify the standards by
which judges are to determine "maturity." It is clear, however, that
the judge must consider the maturity of a minor-presumably her
ability to appreciate the nature of her condition and the risks and ben-
efits of the medical procedure she is seeking-apart from the question
of whether an abortion is in her best interests.
A lawyer is assigned to represent Janet. The lawyer is personally
opposed to abortions and believes that if an eleven-year-old ever
58. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.375(4)(a) (West Supp. 1995).
59. IdL § 48.375(7)(c).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 253.10.
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ought to be allowed to obtain an abortion, her parents should be fully
consulted so that she can have the benefit of their guiding hand during
a traumatic period in her life. The lawyer meets with Janet and con-
cludes that she would be making a serious mistake if she had the abor-
tion and, at least, her best interests would be served if she discussed
this with her parents before having the procedure performed.
What are the lawyer's choices as Janet's counsel? Is she permitted
to tell the judge that Janet is not mature and it is not in her best inter-
ests to have the abortion? Is she authorized to tell the judge that, in
all events, it would be best if Janet's parents had the opportunity to
speak with Janet before any final decision was reached?
Perhaps before answering these questions, a few additional "facts"
are necessary. Assume that, during the initial interview with Janet,
the lawyer told her everything the lawyer was thinking about. As-
sume that Janet responded by telling the lawyer that she has thought
long and hard about her circumstances, that she understands she has a
right to have an abortion without involving her parents, and that she
wants the lawyer to do her best job to persuade the judge to approve
the abortion as quickly as possible.
Having added these facts, we are now in a position to answer the
questions about the lawyer's role. The answers are found by looking
at the substantive law of abortion. Janet's lawyer has only two choices
after unsuccessfully trying as her counselor to dissuade her from seek-
ing judicial consent for the abortion. The lawyer may refuse to repre-
sent her, or she must zealously seek Janet's objectives. Moreover,
these are the lawyer's only choices, whether or not she chooses to
treat Janet as "unimpaired" or "impaired."
As an "unimpaired" client, as defined by the Model Rules, Janet is
empowered to set the objectives of the representation.62 Once her
lawyer considers Janet to be "unimpaired," the lawyer is obligated by
her ethical duties to zealously seek the outcome Janet has chosen.
This straightforward proposition was elaborated upon in the previous
section. 63
The more interesting point is that Janet's lawyer is obliged to seek-
the objectives set by Janet even if the lawyer considers her to be "im-
paired." Although the Model Rules do not confer on "impaired" cli-
ents the right to set the objectives of a case, Janet is empowered to set
these objectives because she possesses a substantive constitutional
right to do so. Because she is pregnant, she has the right to seek an
abortion even though she may be "impaired" within the meaning of a
different law. The substantive law of abortion is that all pregnant mi-
nors-both "impaired" and "unimpaired"-have the right to ask a
62. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.2(a).
63. See supra part II.C.I.
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judge to allow them to abort the fetus they are carrying.' 4 The im-
paired minor's right to reproductive freedom encompasses not only an
entitlement to seek an abortion, but also the corollary right to elect to
carry the fetus to term. These rights were given to Janet by the
Supreme Court of the United States65 and the Wisconsin
Legislature.66
The Model Rules do not grant, nor does a private member of the
bar have, the power to overrule or undermine these authorities. That
is precisely what would result were Janet's lawyer free to thwart Ja-
net's efforts. This would make the lawyer the polar opposite of the
ordinary conception of a lawyer: Instead of enforcing Janet's rights,
she would be vitiating them. Janet's lawyer may well be correct in her
assessment of what is best for Janet. But part of Janet's constellation
of rights is to prefer a result that is bad for her. Not only would the
lawyer be vitiating Janet's rights, she would be undermining the law.
The law makes clear that Janet has the right to persuade a judge that
she is "mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion deci-
sion."67 If she is regarded by the judge as mature and well-informed,
Janet has the right to terminate her pregnancy even when her lawyer
and the judge think an abortion would disserve Janet's best interests.68
It is understandable that lawyers will disapprove of laws that do not,
in their opinion, serve their young clieit's best interests. But that is an
insufficient excuse for lawyers deliberately changing the law to obtain
a result that will make them happier.
64. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990) (declaring that "the
constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into the process of decid-
ing whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant minors as well as adult wo-
men"); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health., 462 U.S. 416, 439-40
(1983) (holding that state may not require the consent of a parent as a condition for
abortion sought by a minor); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93
(1983) (same); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (concluding that if "the
State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an
abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the
abortion can be obtained"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("The State may not impose a blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent
or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor....
65. See supra note 64.
66. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 48.375(4)(a), 48.375(7)(c) (West Supp. 1995).
67. Id. § 48.375(7)(c).
68. So long as Janet's claim is not frivolous, her lawyer has a duty to advance it.
Based on the facts set forth in the text, there would be no basis to regard her claim as
frivolous in this case. In order to regard Janet's claim as frivolous, a lawyer would
have to reasonably believe that no judge could find she was mature and well-in-
formed, and that no judge could find that authorizing an abortion without parental
notice would be in her best interests. To preserve the substantive rights of all clients,
including children, and to ensure these rights are not subject to veto by a hostile bar
unwilling to allow the law to be applied as courts and the legislature have ordained, it
is essential that lawyers be required to seek the lawful objectives of their child clients
unless the lawyer concludes that the positions being advanced are frivolous.
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If Janet's lawyer were allowed to interfere with Janet's rights, she
would change the law dramatically. Under such a new law shaped by
her lawyer's values and beliefs, Janet has the right to have a judge find
she is mature and well-informed only if her lawyer believes it is in
Janet's best interests to enforce her fights. The degree to which this
would constitute unprofessional attorney conduct cannot be over-
stated. Even though the substantive law clearly gives Janet the right
to an abortion, notwithstanding a judge's conclusion that the abortion
would not serve her best interests, a randomly chosen member of the
bar saw fit to transfigure the law to limit Janet's substantive rights by
requiring that a lawyer first conclude it is in Janet's best interests to
allow the law to be enforced in this case.
D. The Proposed Paradigm
Having looked at the role of counsel in several different contexts,
we are now able to construct the paradigm for determining counsel's
role. In all three contexts we examined, including those involving
unimpaired adults and the two matters involving children, the role of
counsel ultimately depended upon the particular substantive rights of
the client. This was just as true when describing counsel's role for
adults as for children.
A common error commentators make in divining the purpose of
counsel is unduly concentrating on the rule that lawyers for adults
must allow their clients to set the objectives of representation.
Although this rule is certainly important, what is even more important
is its underlying policy. As we have seen, the reason an adult's lawyer
must let the adult set the objectives has little to do with an inherent
aspect of lawyering. Instead, it has everything to do with the legal
rights and powers adults possess.
A lawyer's first role is to enforce and advance her clients' legal
rights. Everything else is secondary to this. When clients such as
unimpaired adults or pregnant minors have autonomy rights to con-
trol their own destiny, lawyers are obliged to let them set the objec-
tives of the case. Moreover, in such circumstances, lawyers are not
only permitted, but required, to forcefully advocate for the results
chosen by their clients. In dramatic contrast, however, when clients
do not have autonomy rights (such as young children in most, but not
all situations), lawyers should not allow their clients to set the
objectives.
For these reasons, when determining the role of counsel for children
it is essential to engage in a careful study of the legal rights and pow-
ers children enjoy in the particular subject matter implicated by the
proceeding. The role of counsel for young children necessarily will
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vary across a variety of legal matters.69 This is because the role of
counsel is not developed in a vacuum. What a lawyer for a young
child must or may do will depend directly on the rights of the young
child in the particular matter involved. Because lawyers, above all
else, are the enforcers of their client's rights,7 ° the principal task when
determining counsel's role for young children is to examine the rele-
vant legislation and case law in the particular subject area. Once
those rights have been identified, the only remaining inquiry is to de-
termine the most effective way to enforce them.
III. APPLYING THE PARADIGM
A. Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings in Which
Children are Clients
The first area of law in which we will apply this paradigm is repre-
senting children accused of committing crimes in criminal or juvenile
court. One begins, invariably, with In re Gault.71 For one thing, Gault
announced the constitutional rule that children have a due process
right to be represented in these proceedings.72 That alone would jus-
tify careful study of the case to glean the purpose of counsel for chil-
dren. Interestingly, the Court actually defined the purpose, if
somewhat incompletely. It said that children accused of being delin-
quent need the assistance of counsel in order "to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity
of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether [they have] a defense and
to prepare and submit it."'73 Nonetheless, these are not the only rea-
sons to study Gault. Moreover, the complete answer to the proper
role of counsel is not obtained by studying the Court's language con-
cerning counsel's role, but is only grasped after absorbing other parts
of the decision that make no reference at all to counsel.
It ought to be clear to all that, taken literally, the Court's own defi-
nition of counsel's role is both incomplete and wrong. It is incomplete
because lawyers for accused delinquents are also counselors with a
wide range of responsibilities beyond presenting a defense in a pro-
ceeding. It is wrong to the extent it suggests that defense counsel
69. Thus, in 1984, I erroneously concluded that because lawyers for seven-year-
olds in delinquency proceedings must abide by their clients' instructions, lawyers for
seven-year-olds in all other proceedings must do the same. See Guggenheim, supra
note 15, at 90-91. I failed to recognize that the crucial differences between the sub-
stantive law of juvenile delinquency and certain other proceedings bear directly upon,
and may even change, the role of counsel in various areas of the law.
70. This is so even when lawyers waive their adult clients' rights because part of an
adult's rights is the right to waive rights.
71. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. Id. at 35-37.
73. Md at 36 (citation omitted).
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must submit a defense even when a client wants to waive it and plead
guilty to some part of the underlying charging document.74
The complete key to counsel's role in criminal proceedings in which
children are accused of violating the penal law is found in other parts
of the opinion. Gault held considerably more than that children must
be provided with counsel in delinquency proceedings. Before con-
cluding that children are entitled to counsel, the Court declared that
children have an anterior, substantive right from which certain proce-
dural rights, including the right to counsel, follow. This more basic
right is the right to a limited, but extremely important, kind of auton-
omy. Although the opinion does not speak of autonomy rights, the
Court held that children in delinquency proceedings possess the right
to remain silent,75 a far deeper right than may appear at first glance.
A child's right to remain silent, which courts did not recognize
before Gault, is an important exception to the general rule that chil-
dren are disempowered from making important decisions about their
own lives. Gault liberated children from their usual legal disabilities
and empowered them to resist state intervention by choosing to refuse
to cooperate with prosecutors or judges. In the limited context of
criminal proceedings involving children, it is not a sufficient condition
to intervene coercively in a child's life because the child violated the
penal law. Even when a child commits the charged offense, unless the
child is willing to cooperate with authorities by admitting guilt, no
state may convict except upon evidence presented in court. This has
enormous implications for the rights of children.
The importance of this exceptional empowerment of children can-
not be overstated. Although a generation of lawyers has grown up
under Gault, it must be remembered that from the beginning of the
creation of juvenile court in 1899 until the time of Gault, every court
and legislature believed it was important public policy to require chil-
74. The author of the majority opinion, Justice Fortas, was overbroad in his lan-
guage because a juvenile has the right to waive constitutional privileges. It is conceiv-
able that Justice Fortas believed that juveniles, because of their vulnerability, should
not be permitted to waive their rights and that, unlike adults, the Constitution re-
quires aggressive opposition to jurisdiction in every case. However, that has never
been the law. Certainly by the time the Court decided Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707 (1979), that argument was no longer tenable. The Court made clear that juveniles
may waive their right to remain silent at the police station-even in the face of evi-
dence suggesting that such waivers are rarely knowing and intelligent. See Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal.
L. Rev. 1134, 1152 (1980) (stating that juveniles younger than 15 fail to adequately
comprehend their Miranda rights). If they can do so before they get to court, obvi-
ously they can do so after being in court and after having a lawyer who can counsel
the juvenile before any choice is made. See, e.g., In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 97 (1970)
(finding that a juvenile has the capacity to admit the charges against him and, there-
fore, waive certain constitutional rights).
75. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (holding that the "constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to
adults").
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dren accused of wrongdoing to explain their conduct to police officers
and judges. When the explanation was unsatisfactory, judges were au-
thorized to intervene coercively. This policy was based on the then-
important distinction between the purpose of prosecuting adults and
children-punishment and rehabilitation. Early reformers argued
that a child's own best interests are furthered when adjudging a child
delinquent.76 As the Gault Court noted, "[t]he highest motives and
most enlightened impulses led to" the creation of the delinquency sys-
tem.77 Policymakers concluded that because of these beneficent pur-
poses, children should be required to cooperate with authorities by
answering their questions.
Gault repudiated these ideas, holding that children possess the same
autonomy rights to resist coercive intervention based on alleged crimi-
nal activity that adults enjoy. Although children continue to be de-
nied equivalent self-determination authority in most other legal
matters, they enjoy it in delinquency and criminal cases.
From this newly recognized power of children follows both the need
for and, ultimately, the role of counsel. Because the right to remain
silent requires the state to prove its case by presenting evidence in
court, the Supreme Court turned its attention to enhancing the fair-
ness of the judicial process. The Court concluded that "fundamental
fairness" requires that the evidence presented be competent, holding
that children have the right to cross-examine and confront adverse
witnesses. 78 Once it is a requirement in these proceedings that chil-
dren be given the opportunity to challenge adverse evidence, it is easy
to appreciate why the Court concluded that unassisted children rarely
could effectively use their right to test the state's witnesses. Accord-
ingly, the Court required lawyers. In addition, the Court eventually
clarified the strength of the state's case necessary to convict, holding
that the evidence must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
79
From this, then, we can only conclude that young children are em-
powered to set the objectives of their criminal case to the same degree
as an unimpaired adult. This rule may or may not be wise public pol-
icy. But that debate will be left to legal philosophers. Certainly, that
debate has no place in a discussion on the role of counsel for children.
Regardless of one lawyer's view on the matter, indeed, even if the
overwhelming majority of lawyers believed it is unsound to so em-
power children, the only correct view of counsel's role must be based
on the law's definition of a child's rights. Lawyers are, first and fore-
most, law enforcers. They are no more free to act upon their disagree-
ment with the Supreme Court's pronouncements of law in the exercise
of their duties when representing children than a government official
76. Id- at 15-16.
77. Id at 17.
78. Id. at 56-57.
79. In re W'mship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
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is free to refuse to enforce a duly enacted law. Unless children are
allowed by lawyers to set the objectives in their cases, they would not
only be effectively deprived of a number of constitutional rights, they
would be denied procedures that are fundamental to the rule of law.
The lawyer, not the child, would decide whether the child should
forgo his or her right to remain silent. The lawyer, not the trier of
fact, would effectively decide what outcome is in the child's best
interests.
What, then, is the role of counsel in criminal proceedings involving
children? The same as it is in criminal proceedings involving adults.
By this I do not mean there are no differences. Lawyers for children
need to be particularly good communicators. They need to be keenly
sensitive to the risk that their clients will put too much faith in their
advice because the lawyer has even more power to persuade a child
client to agree to a particular result than an adult client. In addition,
the sentencing structure for juvenile proceedings is dramatically dif-
ferent from their adult counterpart and, as a result, lawyers for chil-
dren need to pay careful attention to these differences."0 But these
differences are all a matter of detail. The sense in which I mean there
are no differences in the representation between children and adults is
in the underlying purposes and goals of the representation. Lawyers
representing children in criminal proceedings, like lawyers represent-
ing adults in criminal proceedings, are ethically obligated to seek the
objectives of the case as defined by their clients, whether or not the
lawyers think those objectives are sound for the client or for society.,,
Lawyers are free not to work in the field if they do not want to live by
these rules but they are not free to change the rules as they see fit.
B.. Custody and Visitation Proceedings
Custody and visitation proceedings differ substantially from crimi-
nal and delinquency cases. In particular, the law's treatment of chil-
dren is dramatically different. In delinquency proceedings, children
80. See I Randy Hertz et al., Trial Manual for Defense Attorneys in Juvenile
Court § 2.01(g) (1991).
81. Both adult defendants and accused juvenile delinquents may be "impaired" in
a different sense than we have been discussing in this Article. That impairment would
make it impossible for the lawyer to interpose any defense in the case. The right to
obtain a fair trial is breached when an accused who by reason of mental disease or
disorder is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to
consult and cooperate with counsel in preparing and presenting a defense. See, e.g.,
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (asserting that a person who "lacks the
[mental] capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him,
to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to
a trial"); In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1979) (finding that the
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent applies even in juvenile delin-
quency adjudicatory proceedings). For this reason, neither an incompetent adult de-
fendant nor an incompetent accused juvenile delinquent may stand trial or plead
guilty to crimes charged during the period of incompetency.
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are empowered to choose whether or not to permit state intervention.
In custody proceedings, although a child's preference-when the child
is old enough to express thems2-is sufficiently important that it is to
be made known to the judge and courts, legislatures have consistently
concluded that a child ought not to be able to control the outcome of
a custody case. For the vast majority of children, these lawmakers
have decided that a child's preference should be at most a small part
of the picture a court should take into account when deciding the
case.8 3 In no jurisdiction is the preference of a child under fourteen-
years-old more than one factor among many which the judge is to take
into account when determining the child's best interests. 4
For this reason, it does not advance the law for a child's lawyer to
try to effect a result sought by a young child merely because that is
what the child wants. Indeed, it may undermine the law for the child's
lawyer to be successful based on the child's preferences. Without the
child's lawyer, the child's views would have been given some, but not
dispositive, weight by the judge. With the child's lawyer aggressively
pursuing a result dictated by the child, the child's preferences may
have a much greater influence on the outcome.8 5 By this paradigm,
however, the lawyer is required to advance the client's substantive
legal rights. Because children do not have the substantive right to
control the outcome, their lawyers are not required to advocate for
outcomes sought by young children.
82. Another important factor that distinguishes delinquency cases from custody
and visitation proceedings is that many children in the latter type of proceedings are
younger than seven-years-old; indeed, a large number of such children are under
three years of age. In delinquency cases in most jurisdictions, children must be at
least age seven and most are over ten years old.
83. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-332(A) (Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 46b-56a-46b-56b (West 1995); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1995).
84. "Today, statutes in many states direct courts to consider the child's preference,
often as one among several factors that guide decision making." Elizabeth S. Scott et
al., Children's Preference in Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1035, 1035
(1988). California, for example, directs the court to give as much weight to a child's
preference as the court sees fit when "a child is of sufficient age and capacity to rea-
son so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody." Cal. Civ. Code § 4600(a)
(West 1983).
85. One problem is that advocacy is not moderated by a rheostat. Set a lawyer
into motion as an advocate for a cause, and be prepared to pay the consequences.
Lawyers simply are not trained to be lukewarm in their efforts to obtain a desired
outcome. For most purposes, either a lawyer will meaningfully seek to obtain a par-
ticular result or the lawyer will not. Respect for a lawyer's skills as an advocate re-
quires that we limit the circumstances under which lawyers should be permitted to
advocate at all.
I am not advancing a personal view here that a child's preference should not be a
major factor in deciding a custody dispute. I am merely pointing out that when law-
yers advocate for outcomes their young clients have chosen, the child's preference will
become a major factor in the decision-making process. If children's preferences
should control more cases, this change in the law should come about as a result of
legislative or common law changes in the substantive rules, not by a call for counsel.
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What are a child's substantive fights in custody proceedings? The
obvious answer is they have a right to be placed with the caregiver
who will best serve their interests. But, more precisely-and more
importantly to a discussion of counsel's role in furthering a child cli-
ent's legal rights-they have a right to have a judge determine their
best interests. A child's rights have been fully furthered whenever a
judge makes a considered decision based on accurate information
about the child and her parents.
This distinction is important because it separates two ideas that
commonly are conjoined within the concept of children's rights. It
confuses things to say that children have the right to have their best
interests advanced. This is confusing because it is impossible to know
when a child's rights have, in fact, been advanced. 6 The only mean-
ingful and enforceable right children have in this connection is the
procedural one to have a judge try in good faith to decide the case
solely based on the child's best interests. When that is done, the
child's rights have been fully served whether or not someone might
continue to complain that the child's best interests actually would
have been served by a different result. The best interests standard is
procedural in nature; it tells judges how they are supposed to think
and act. It is not a promise to children that they will live happily after
the decision, or even that their lives will be better than if the court
decided the case differently. 7
The question remains: What acts by a child's lawyer are most likely
to advance the child's legal rights? Having eschewed the possibility of
advocating an outcome based on the child's preference, either lawyers
should be permitted to advocate an outcome based on their views
about what is best for the child or they must be prohibited from advo-
86. Catherine M. Brooks, When a Child Needs a Lawyer, 23 Creighton L. Rev.
757, 771 (1990). The author states:
[T]he factual foundation for a 'best interests' position cannot be determined.
Knowing, advocating, and adopting the position which addresses the best
interests of the child requires a prediction of the future of the child, the
child's relationships within the family, and the parents' ability to meet the
apparent and hidden needs of the child. All of those pieces which make up a
'best interests' analysis cannot be known in any real way. Speculation about
a child's best interests does not provide a firm foundation for decision-mak-
ing, and yet it appears that speculation is precisely what is called for when
children's futures are to be decided.
Id.
87. This is demonstrated by the fact that parents remain free through the point of
final judgment to settle a case without a judge's determining the child's best interests.
Parents have extremely wide latitude to resolve custody and visitation arrangements
by themselves before and without seeking judicial intervention and even after seeking
such intervention by settling the matter. When parents resolve their dispute without
court involvement or before a judge decides it for them, the resolution need not meet
the standard of comporting with the child's "best interests." See Martin Guggenheim,
The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado About Nothing?, in Child, Parent, and
State: Law and Policy Reader 27, 29 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994).
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cating any outcome whatsoever.8 8 The reasons against encouraging
counsel to advocate an outcome when representing children dis-
empowered from setting the objectives for their case previously have
been discussed.8 9 First, empowering lawyers in this way does little to
advance the child's rights. When lawyers advance a result they
wrongly believe to be best for their client, the problem is that their
advocacy may succeed. In such cases, the lawyer's power was en-
hanced at the client's expense. In addition, allowing lawyers to decide
for themselves what outcome to seek would return us to the same
chaotic universe we must avoid if the rule of law is to be applied.
The search for an objective, uniform rule that advances the child's
legal right to have the case decided by the judge in accordance with
the child's best interests leads to the rule recently adopted by the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.9" Lawyers for young
children should make certain that judges are placed in the best posi-
tion to make a considered judgment about the child's best interests.
During the pretrial stage, lawyers "should use all appropriate proce-
dures to develop facts which the decision-maker should consider in
deciding the case and which otherwise would not be brought to the
decision-maker's attention."91 In addition, when an evidentiary hear-
ing is conducted, lawyers should strive to "make the decision-maker
aware of all facts which the decision-maker should consider."92 How-
ever, this should be done as a nonpartisan who wants "to place the
court in the best possible position to decide the case on the basis of
the child's best interests." 93
In addition to placing the fact finder in the optimal position to de-
cide the case correctly, a child's lawyer can perform a number of addi-
tional tasks that advance a child's legal interests that are not
dependent either on the wishes of the child or the personal beliefs of
the lawyer. It is appropriate to expect lawyers to protect children
from the pressures and pain associated with contentious litigation and
to try to reduce conflict by encouraging parents to focus on the needs
88. IA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating
to Counsel for Private Parties § 3.1(b)(ii)[b] commentary at 82 (1980). Unfortunately,
courts commonly expect counsel to represent the child's "best interests" and to ex-
press his or her opinion on the appropriate outcome, even when this opinion is not
consistent with the child's. See In re Marriage of Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 (1989); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d
79, 86 (Mont. 1985).
89. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
90. See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyirs, Representing Children:
Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceed-
ings (1995) [hereinafter Standards]. In the interests of full disclosure, I was the Re-
porter for the Academy in drafting those standards. -
91. 1d. § 2.12.
92. Id. § 2.13.
93. kd § 2.13(a) cmt.
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and best interests of the children.94 In an effort to reduce acrimony,
lawyers may attempt to facilitate settlement, so long as their purpose
is not to secure a particular result. Finally, of course, a lawyer should
strive to ensure that their client is made to feel as good as possible
about the case.
In short, counsel for young children should maximize the possibility
that the case will impose the least harm possible on the child. This
goal is not necessarily advanced at all when counsel advocates a par-
ticular result. It is likely to be advanced, however, when lawyers
shield their clients from harm, reduce tension between the parties, ex-
pedite the proceedings, and see to it that cases are most likely to be
decided on the basis of what is best for children.
95
C. Child Protective Proceedings
Given the importance to the determination of counsel's role of
carefully identifying a child's substantive rights in the particular sub-
ject matter area in question, we begin by clarifying those rights in the
area of child protection. As we shall see, that is not a simple task.
One thing, however, is undeniable. As in custody cases, child protec-
tive proceedings have virtually nothing to do with empowering chil-
dren. Children have no more right to insist that the state intervene to
protect them from inadequate parents than to insist that the state stay
out of their lives. In fact, children have even less autonomy in child
protective proceedings than in custody matters. In custody matters, a
child's view regarding placement is at least one of the factors the court
must consider when determining custody. But a child's view regarding
placement is totally irrelevant during the initial phase of a child pro-
94. Wilber, supra note 6, at 351. Reflecting on the need to protect children, the
author notes:
One critical function is the protection of the child from any unnecessary
harm that may flow from the proceedings themselves. Parents engaged in a
bitter custody battle or a protracted child abuse proceeding, for example,
are often blind to the child's need for a prompt, harmonious resolution.
Counsel for the child can oppose unnecessary continuances, move to quash
frivolous motions, or request a court order providing counseling or other
supportive services for the child.
Id.
95. See Standards, supra note 90, § 2.6. The Commentary to this Standard states:
This Standard requires counsel to take appropriate steps to deescalate all
conflict in the litigation. Counsel should try, consistent with the client's in-
structions on the goals: (a) to resolve the dispute in the least contentious
manner, (b) to resolve the dispute in the most expeditious manner; and (c)
to expose the child to as little of the controversy as possible. To accomplish
this, counsel should attempt to negotiate disputes that have the potential to
escalate into harmful conflict. Counsel should also urge the parties and their
lawyers to keep the interests of the child paramount, reminding them at vari-
ous stages of the proceedings how particular actions may affect th6 child and
recommending alternative actions that would better serve the child's
interests.
Il § 2.6 cmt. (footnote omitted).
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tective case in which the court must determine whether there is a legal
and factual basis to consider removing the child from his or her
family.
9 6
Child protective proceedings accord children special rights to pro-
tection from harm imposed by their caregivers. 97 But these idiosyn-
cratic rights require careful study before applying them to determine
the role of counsel for young children. Children have distinctive pro-
tective rights. Their primary right is to remain in their parents' cus-
tody unless their parents have been inadequate.98 However, children
also have the right to be protected from their parents when their par-
ents fall below the minimal standard of care established by law. Their
right to state protection, in other words, is conditional. If, and only if,
a parent is inadequate, should the state interfere with the parents' and
child's right to familial integrity.99
It is possible to define a child's substantive rights in this area in one
of two ways. We might say that children have a right to live with their
96. Child protective proceedings have two phases: the trial or adjudicatory phase,
and the dispositional phase. The latter part of the case is not reached if the court
dismisses the matter at the conclusion of a trial, as it must do when the petitioner fails
to meet its burden of proving that a parent is unfit within the definition of the neglect
or abuse statute.
97. See Wald, supra note 29, at 260. As Wald states:
There are four different types of claims under the general rubric of children's
rights. While there is some overlap among the categories, each has special
characteristics relevant to analyzing whether children should be given such
rights. The categories are: (A) generalized claims against the world, e.g., the
right of freedom from discrimination and poverty; (B) the right to greater
protection from abuse, neglect or exploitation by adults; (C) the right to be
treated in the same manner as an adult, with the same constitutional protec-
tions, in relationship to state actions; (D) the right to act independently of
parental control and/or guidance.
Id.
98. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). New York's statutory
scheme, for example, states:
(i) it is desirable for children to grow up with a normal family life in a per-
manent home and that such circumstance offers the best opportunity for
children to develop and thrive; (ii) it is generally desirable for the child to
remain with or be returned to the natural parent because the child's need for
a normal family life will usually best be met in the natural home... ; (iii) the
state's first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-
up or to reunite it if the child has already left home; and (iv) when it is clear
that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family home for
the child... then a permanent alternative home should be sought for the
child.
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(1)(a) (McKinney 1992).
99. See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of
the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 Duke J. Gender L. &
Pol'y 63, 71 (1995); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (stating that only when the state
proves parental unfitness may the court assume that the interests of the child and the
parents differ); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) ("[P]arents ... retain a sub-
stantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse,
and.., the traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their
child should apply.").
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parents unless a court finds the parents unfit. Under such a definition,
lawyers for children should regard intervention, even to protect chil-
dren from harm, as an intrusion into their clients' rights to be raised
by their parents. This definition of a child's rights, and the corollary
role of counsel for young children, I recognize, will trouble many chil-
dren's advocates. These advocates will assert that this definition of a
child's rights is inaccurate. For them, children have the right to be
separated from their parents whenever their parents are actually unfit,
not just when a judge enters a determination of unfitness. That is,
children have the right to be free from harm, not merely to have a
judge decide whether they are endangered.
There is much force to this alternative definition. Even when we
accept it, however, the challenge still remains to clarify counsel's role.
Certainly, it cannot be irrelevant to the determination of counsel's
role that the law prefers nonintervention and presumes that children
are best off remaining in their parents' custody without coercive assist-
ance.100 At a minimum, this preference means that children's lawyers
cannot presume their clients' interests are served by supporting inter-
vention. Before a child's lawyer should be allowed to support inter-
vention, we may expect that the lawyer has concluded that the child's
interests require protection.
We have already seen, however, the dangers created when lawyers
are allowed to reach conclusions about facts that are preconditional to
arguing an outcome in the case.1 1 In the real world, judges rely on
the advocacy of a child's lawyer.'0 It is impossible to know, however,
whether the lawyer's views advance or hinder the child's rights. Be-
cause the child's right to secure state protection is conditional, that
right is wrongfully invoked when the predicate facts justifying it do
not exist. If a parent abused her child, the child has the right to be
protected. But if a parent has not, the child has the right to have the
case dismissed without additional intervention. When a young child's
lawyer argues that the court should remove the child from her home
100. If, for example, state law requires that children should be removed from their
parents' custody whenever there is some evidence to believe the parents are inade-
quate, it would not be controversial to suggest that a young child's lawyer's obligation
in child protective cases is, except in unusual cases, to forcefully argue for their re-
moval. Similarly, given the substantive law in most states, it should not be regarded
as too radical to suggest that lawyers for young children should presume their clients'
interests are served by thwarting intervention.
101. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
102. See Patricia S. Curley & Gregg Herman, Representing the Best Interests of
Children: The Wisconsin Experience, J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial L. (1995)'(forthcom-
ing Feb. 1996) (manuscript at 9, on file with Fordham Law Review). In the authors'
experience in Wisconsin, the recommendation of the child's representative "is com-
monly the eventual order of the court" whether that result is achieved by settlement
or trial. Moreover, they assert that the outcome of emergency hearings usually is
based exclusively on the guardian's recommendation. Id.
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based on the lawyer's incorrect conclusion that the parent is unfit, the
lawyer has breached the child's right not to be removed.
In addition, as we have seen also, the lawyer's views on the proper
result unavoidably will be the product of a host of factors that will
never be the subject of review by anybody.10 3 Finally, liberating law-
yers for children to advocate results they believe are best for their
clients will ensure the randomness and chaos that a rational legal sys-
tem would avoid whenever possible. It is eminently possible to avoid
such chaos in child protective proceedings by the simple device of bar-
ring lawyers from advocating an outcome. We should be particularly
willing to impose this restriction precisely because there is no assur-
ance in the first place that the lawyer will seek the correct result. °4
Because lawyers for children should be law enforcers, their role
throughout the fact-finding stage of a child protective proceeding is to
attempt, in the most objective way, to aggressively enforce the law as
it was written by the legislature and interpreted by the courts. They
should advocate for particular results, however, only when those re-
sults do not depend on ancillary findings of fact. Instead, in accord-
ance with the law in every state, lawyers for children should insist that
children not be removed from their parents' custody until a court has
determined, based on reliable evidence, that there are statutory
grounds for removal. When children are removed, their lawyers
should insist, again in accordance with ubiquitous law, that regular
and frequent visitation takes place.
As in custody and visitation cases, lawyers for children should en-
sure that the prosecution of the case not adversely affect the children.
Children should be shielded from unnecessary examination and inter-
views; proceedings should be resolved fairly but expeditiously. Law-
yers for children should help level the playing field. When they
perceive an inadequate or overworked prosecution office, it will be
important for children's lawyers to ensure that all available facts sup-
103. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 56, at 451 (stating that "it is completely up to the
attorney to decide whether to follow the child's wishes").
104. There can be no doubt that lawyers for children seek the best result for chil-
dren most of the time. I have always believed that. My point is more modest. In
most of the cases that lawyers for children seek the best result for their clients, I
believe the same result would have been reached anyway. For this reason, in my
opinion, the percentage of cases in which lawyers for children were needed for the
court to reach the correct result is a much smaller fraction of the total cases of lawyers
seeking the correct result. Especially in easy cases-those in which the correct result
is fairly clear-it is reasonable to expect that judges would achieve that result without
a child's counsel leading them there. Thus, for a large number of cases, lawyers for
children are unnecessary. They may not cause much harm but they will do little good.
One might think, therefore, counsel for children can be particularly valuable when
they recommend an outcome in hard cases-those in which it is not clear what out-
come is correct. Though this may appear attractive, it is precisely in the hard cases
that the risks of mistakes increase. In those cases, one cannot be nearly as confident
that lawyers will seek the correct result.
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porting the agency's case be placed before the judge. As in custody
and visitation cases, this should be presented in a nonpartisan manner.
Similarly, when the child's lawyer perceives the parent's attorney as
inadequate or overworked, it is important for the lawyer to ensure
that all facts supporting the parents be presented to the court. Finally,
when children enter the foster care system, their lawyers should pay
careful attention to their well-being during the entire period they are
state wards.
CONCLUSION
The Model Rules are only one source for ascertaining the role of
counsel for young children. Although these Rules are an important
part of any analysis of the role of counsel for young children, they
cannot be counted upon to answer the most vexing questions on the
subject. One must study the entire corpus of laws establishing chil-
dren's rights in a particular setting before settling on a defined role for
counsel. Sometimes lawyers must allow their clients to set the objec-
tives for a case even when the rules of the profession do not require
this. At other times, this Article recommends that lawyers be barred
from engaging in conduct that the professional rules would allow.
By applying the paradigm developed in this Article, one learns that
lawyers for children are obliged by the Model Rules to faithfully fol-
low their clients' instructions whenever children are empowered by
any source of law to set the case's objectives. In no other circum-
stance are lawyers constrained by professional rules of conduct to act
in a particular way.
Once lawyers are freed from constraints based on professional
rules, it is necessary to search for their role as counsel. Ideally, this
search will lead to a role that will be performed time and again by all
members of the bar in a comparable manner in like cases. In this
Article, I argue that counsel's principal objective should be to be-
come the child client's law enforcer (that is, the precise, uniform ser-
vice counsel performs when she carries out the instructions of a client
authorized by law to set objectives for a matter). The law enforcer
role is not furthered, however, when lawyers empower children to set
the objectives for a case when the relevant substantive law has dis-
empowered them.
In those cases in which lawyers are not constrained by law, this Ar-
ticle argues that the principle of being law enforcer is better served by
assisting the judge to decide the case correctly with a minimum of
involvement by the child. The only way to accomplish this and per-
form a consistent role is for the lawyer to uncover relevant facts that
place the judge in the best position to decide the case and to protect
the child from harm that may result from the litigation itself. When
lawyers perform this role, the danger that the case will be contami-
nated by the lawyer's values are minimized. At the same time, the
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lawyer will have performed a role that is most likely to increase the
prospects that a child's rights will be advanced.

